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From Strategic Modelling of Urban Transit Systems 
to Golden Rules for their Design and Management 
Fabien Leurent (
1
), François Combes, Rob Van Nes 
Université Paris Est, Laboratoire Ville Mobilité Transport, Ecole des Ponts ParisTech 
Abstract 
The paper provides a synthetic, “strategic” model of transit systems in urban areas that 
features out a set of modes, quality of service and terminal access, demand and network usage 
by users’ trips, with some hints of spatial heterogeneity. The model encompasses technical 
relationships relating fleet size and design parameters such as infrastructure length and station 
spacing, to frequency, commercial speed and access distance, hence to wait time, running 
time and access/egress time. Economic features are modelled, too: generalized costs to 
individual users, demand elasticity, supply costs and system welfare. The model can be used 
for synthetic statistical description of real-world systems as well as for economic analysis and 
the assessment of given system states against theoretical references. 
After introducing the model elements and relationships, we put forward a causal diagram that 
synthesizes the system under study and constitutes the model architecture. We then turn to 
mathematical analysis to formalize (i) the determination of a system state on the basis of a 
supply plan, technical relationships and demand behaviour, (ii) the optimisation of system 
welfare with respect to the action levers on the supply side. Next, for an uncongested system 
we establish theoretical conditions for both an optimum system state under fixed demand and 
a second best optimum under variable demand and tariffs. Three “golden rules” for transit 
network design and management are established, namely (i) balancing the rolling stock costs 
and the users’ costs of waiting time, (ii) balancing the station costs plus the value to users of 
the dwelling part of their in-network times, against the users’ costs of “longitudinal” access 
times, (iii) balancing the full supply costs and the users’ costs of “transversal” access times. 
Furthermore, the existence and uniqueness of a System Optimum state are proven and a 
solution scheme is provided. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A transportation system is purported to serve the mobility needs of its customers. It is made 
up of one or several technical “modes” that are spread through the space in a given territory, 
mostly in network form in the urban setting. According to the general economic theory of 
welfare, such a technical system ought to be planned so as to serve travel demand in an 
optimal way i.e. by maximizing the net surplus of its users (Dupuit, 1844), which amounts to 
the difference between their gross surplus and the travel costs which they incur. In fact, the 
user bears both money costs that include prices paid for service access and use plus specific 
expenses (e.g. vehicle costs in private transport) and also the money equivalent of the time 
spent in travelling (Beckmann et al. 1956). In turn, the service prices should reflect the 
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production costs that are borne by the suppliers. Externalities such as scale or scope 
economies on the supply side, or impacts on the environment (such as pollutant emissions and 
contribution to greenhouse gases), can be taken into account by modifying the welfare 
function of collective surplus (Quinet and Vickerman, 2004). 
To apply these general principles to the management of a given system, it is required to build 
a specific economic model that represents both the “local” demand and the “local” supply – 
here “local” refers to the territory. The specific setting must be modelled in terms of modal 
techniques, spatial features and behavioural features of the economic agents. Furthermore, the 
action levers available for system management need be identified and characterized. The 
multi-layered structure of a transportation system, from infrastructure to services passing by 
vehicles, lends itself to a variety of action levers. Infrastructural schemes either roadway- or 
railway-based or modal / intermodal stations, as well as transit services and demand-oriented 
mobility policies are traditionally addressed by using a Travel Demand Model. Such a TDM 
depicts the demand side in terms of passenger and/or freight flows and their respective 
behaviour concerning the choice of mode, path, departure time, destination place etc., and 
also the supply side in terms of network routes and services (Ortuzar and Willumsen, 2004). 
Such a model enables mobility analysts to incept and test projects of infrastructure and/or 
services in an incremental way, as well as pricing policies, in order to assess alternative 
planning scenarios and to aid decision-making in system planning. The objective function 
used in scenario assessment involves both demand surplus and supply surplus, since in most 
cases the relationship between usage prices and production costs is not straightforward (De 
Rus, 200x). 
There are also network design models in which planning schemes are generated 
automatically, typically by adding links and nodes of infrastructure and/or services to a 
reference network (REF). In this stream, each scheme is evaluated on the basis of an objective 
function that involves some demand model (which amounts to a simplified TDM) and above 
all a technical and economic model of the production, its means and their costs. 
Every supply scenario is evaluated on the basis of reference unit costs, e.g. the cost of a new 
road link obtains by multiplying its length by a cost per unit distance that depends on the 
infrastructural type and local set-ups. Such unit costs are evaluated in an average way by 
reference to past experience for analogous cases: their nature is basically statistical. 
A second kind of system management models addresses traffic regulation at the level either of 
a junction node, or a line or corridor, or a sub-network or a full network; there, the action 
levers consist mainly in capacity set-ups – e.g. to share the time of green at a signalled 
roadway junction between the traffic streams via its branches. Other regulation levers consist 
in speed regulation, right-of-way assignment of some traffic lanes, access regulation, dynamic 
pricing and dynamic traffic information (e.g. Papageorgiou). 
To sum up, the above-mentioned models deal with system management at two levels: system 
planning with manual or automated system design versus traffic regulation. 
A third kind of management models may be identified concerning the composition of vehicle 
fleets: notably so to address the types of motors, energy vectors and environmental 
performance. The related vehicle-fleet models are generally built on a standalone basis prior 
to connecting them to a TDM at one or two stages (about network assignment and maybe also 
users’ decisions of motorization). 
Thus it appears that the complex structure of transportation systems is mirrored in 
management models that pertain each to one layer out of the three, Infrastructure, Vehicles, 
Services & operations. However, multi-layer policies are in order to manage the system in an 
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integrated way, by involving long-term, planning-based levers as well as short-term, 
regulation-based ones and by considering each technical mode in connection to the other 
modes rather than on a standalone basis. In a given territory, both the local authorities and the 
network operators are interested in such an integrated approach. 
Among the issues of strategic importance, let us mention (i) the multimodal quality of service 
supplied to the users, (ii) the multimodal environmental impacts, (iii) the financial costs to the 
community, especially so in contexts of diminishing financial resources. Among the diverse 
modes, a key issue is the “relevance area” of each mode: in the urban setting, is the mode 
better suited for more or less dense areas, under which particular technical set-ups – e.g. 
station spacing along a transit line? 
1.2 Objective: a synthetic model for strategic planning and theoretical 
properties 
From the previous discussion, let us conclude that there is room for a strategic model of 
transportation systems in order to provide synthetic overview, economic evaluation and some 
guidelines for system optimization. Our very aim in this paper is to bring about such a model 
in the field of urban passenger transit. 
The model captures (i) some spatial features, from trip endpoints and regions in space to 
distances between origins and destinations, passing by the lengths of way sections, (ii) modal 
techniques of urban passenger transit, each with specific technical factors including vehicle 
capacity, service frequency, running speed, station spacing, and a technical production 
function linking these factors to the resulting quality of service in terms of run time and wait 
time, (iii) service users and their trips, with individual generalized costs based on tariffs and 
travel times, plus some demand elasticity to cost, (iv) on the supply side, cost functions and 
the consideration of policy packages acting on design levers – infrastructure length and 
station spacing – as well as fleet size and tariffs. 
Thus it is a technical as well as economic model, and also a strategic model as it enables one 
to analyse planning trade-offs between modes and regions, in a simplified yet still meaningful 
way. We submit the model to an analytical study of system optimality: by mathematical 
derivation of optimality conditions between the action levers and the dependent state 
variables, we obtain generic properties that characterize the optimal design and management 
of an urban transit system. 
1.3 Method 
Previous works in the field of strategic models for transportation planning fall into two 
streams. First, some TDM have been designed as “strategic models” by reducing the set of 
Traffic Analysis Zones (TAZ) to at most some dozens of “macro-zones”, and similarly 
simplifying the roadway and / or transit networks to aggregate characteristics such as the line 
length of sub-network by mode in each TAZ. Then, by zone and mode the sub-network length 
and the local trip flow may be related to local speed by an aggregate function. The system of 
trip flows has been modelled as flow exchanges between neighbouring zones (REF) or as 
origin-destination (O-D) flows to be assigned to local and modal sub-networks by an average, 
aggregated network assignment (REF). Such models are mainly used to simplify the 
presentation to decision-makers of the detailed results obtained using a finer TDM (LAET). 
In the second stream, the set of demand zones is even more simplified into a couple of 
regions, of which the sub-networks by mode are also simplified and aggregated further than in 
the first stream. Van Nes (2002)… 
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Each technical factor… 
Our own work pertains to the latter stream of research. We build upon Van Nes’s model of 
urban transit, keeping the three technical relationships of (i) terminal access time, (ii) service 
frequency and (iii) service commercial speed, by adding the diversity of regions, a set of 
transit modes and traffic phenomena, and by dealing with intermodal trip chains between the 
regions. 
To curb the additional complexity, we have invested in systems analysis, “statistical” 
representation and mathematical formulation. We put the issue of system optimization as a 
mathematical program of constrained optimization, of which we derive the first order 
optimality conditions. At this stage, the linkage between strategic modelling and economic 
theory becomes very clear: our strategic model under its abstract formulation constitutes a 
theoretical economic model of multimodal transit in an urban area. 
1.4 Structure 
The rest of the paper is organized in six sections with roadmap as follows. Section 2 provides 
the macroscopic, statistical representation of space, supply, demand and usage that are the 
basic system features. In Section 3, the system structure is laid out and the interactions 
between the components are modelled as causal relationships of technical and / or economic 
nature. Section 4 completes the modelling framework by identifying the impacts and stating 
the values and costs of primary interest in the system, namely demand surplus and supply 
costs. Then, Section 5 provides a mathematical formulation of the model and uses it to 
analyse not only the determination of a system state under exogenous supply plan but also the 
optimization of system welfare by setting up an adequate plan. For the uncongested case in 
which traffic variations exert no effects on supply performance or demand behaviour, Section 
6 provides an economic theory of system optimization, with some characteristic properties of 
an optimal state that can be called “golden rules” for system design and management. Lastly, 
Section 7 offers a discussion and some conclusions. 
In a companion paper, the model is applied to the case of Greater Paris as an instance.  
Table 1: Notation 
z  region (i.e. macro-zone in urban area), with set Z 
zA  area of region z   
m  transit mode, with set M  
),( zmr =  supply component, with set R 
rL  infrastructure length or line length of component r , with unit cost Lrc  by period H 
rσ  number of stations in component r , with unit cost rcσ  by period H 
rS  station spacing in component r   
rv  commercial speed stations in component r  
rϕ  service frequency 
rβ  headway regularity factor 
rN  fleet size, with unit cost Nrc  by period H 
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Ard  average walking distance between trip endpoint and nearest station 
rχ  shape parameter of component r   
i  O-D pair belonging to set I, with origin region +iz  and destination region 
−
iz   
iw  walking speed. 
X
rit  (resp. 
X
rid ) the time (resp. distance) in stage X and component r  by trip in segment i , 
with user’s specific value of time Xiγ . 
iθ  money equivalent of travel time by trip 
iτ  network tariff 
ig  generalized cost for individual user of segment i . 
iD  demand function 
iQ  trip flow during period H 
riI  (resp. riO ) input (resp. output) flow of segment i  from region to mode (during period) 
i
rs
i
rs
i
rs MMM
ˆ+=  number of i -bound trips transferring from r  to s , irsMˆ  with line / mode 
change and irsM  without.  
i
rA  (resp. 
i
rB ) the number of alightings (resp. boardings) in r  due to segment i . 
i
rΛ  (resp. irλ ) the number of legs (resp. average length of them) in r  due to segment i . 
X
rix  assignment factor of segment i  to component r  and  stage X in {A/E, R, W, T} 
rω  dwelling time per vehicle run and station in r , with reference value 0rω   
ra  (resp. rb ) the number of alightings (resp. boardings) by vehicle run and station in r . 
AB
rk  exchange capacity per time unit by vehicle in r   
rk  (resp. rk ) seated (resp. standing) capacity by vehicle in r   
ry  (resp. rρ ) passenger flow (resp. density) by vehicle (underlined / barred for seated / 
standing)  
rη  average track reservation in r  during period 
rVˆ  function linking reference running speed to track reservation 
X
rE  Effect factor of characteristic time in stage X and component r   
SR Minimum supply revenue to achieve under Variable demand 
Bµ+=µ 1  dual parameter, with Bµ  multiplier associated to budget constraint 
SC System cost function 
£ Lagrangian function of System Optimization program 
Xrµ  dual variable associated to the technical constraint that determines primal variable  rX   
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2. The statistical representation of supply and demand 
Our objective here is to model the essential technical and economic features of supply and 
demand in the system, in a both meaningful and sufficiently aggregate manner. As our 
treatment involves the aggregate description of collections of entities such as modal stations 
in a given region of space, we refer to it as “statistical”. We shall first provide the 
representation of space (§ 2.1), then that of transport supply (§ 2.2), followed by that of travel 
demand (§ 2.3). Next, we focus on two basic interactions between supply and demand, 
respectively the usage of transit supply by demand (§ 2.4) and the issue of access distance 
between trip end points and transit stations (§ 2.5). 
2.1 The representation of space 
A whole urban area is taken as study area, delimited by a given perimeter. It is divided in 
regions, indexed by Z∈z  the set of zones, each one with its own ground area, zA . Within 
the area, every transit user performs their activities in given locations, of which the particular 
points constitute endpoints for both the trips prior and next to the activity. Instead of locating 
particular points accurately, we shall only identify their regions and deal with the issue of 
network access in a specific, statistical way (Cf. § 2.5). 
Similarly, modal stations are characterized by their regions and modes, whereas their 
individual locations are dealt with statistically. Concerning points along transit routes, we do 
not need to identify them – the only requirement being to model transfers between regions 
and/or lines or modes (Cf. § 2.4). 
2.2 Transport supply 
Apart from walking that is addressed in a statistical way of its own (Cf. subsection on 
network access), let us describe the supply of transit services that belong to a set M  of transit 
modes indexed by m . These may represent the Bus, the Tram, the Metro, or Suburban Rail. 
A key notion is that of a “supply component”, or “network component” that is a mode and 
region pair denoted by ),( zmr =  with set R . We model transit supply basically by 
component, each of which is characterized by the following attributes: 
+ infrastructure length or line length rL  adds up the lengths of rail tracks or road lanes that 
are used in region z  by the transit routes of mode m . Each line track / lane section is counted 
only once: by assumption it serves the two directions of traffic. Line length is the 
component’s key feature concerning the coverage of space. 
+ as stations provide local access, the number rσ  of them is relevant. As it is counted at the 
line level then aggregated at the sub-network level, the total number represents a number of 
“stops” i.e. of incidences between lines and stations. 
+ between consecutive stations along a line served by transit routes, the spacing influences the 
running times of the vehicles. Let us consider an aggregate spacing, denoted rS , averaged 
over the line elements in the sub-network. 
+ commercial speed rv  depicts service efficiency and is averaged over the vehicle runs 
serving the component. More precisely, it is the harmonic average resulting from vehicles’ 
travel times over the runs 
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+ service frequency, denoted rϕ , is counted by station and traffic direction. It influences 
passenger wait time on service access. 
+ parameter rβ  is a regularity factor for headway intervals, with value of 1 for perfectly 
regular headways or 2 in the absence of memory. 
+ fleet size rN  denotes the number of vehicles involved in service operations in the 
component. It is a technical parameter of much economic significance since vehicle fleet 
constitutes a major part in the system investment costs. 
The statement of production costs is provided in Section 4. As for now, let us emphasize that 
the notion of a component is modeled very much like a single transit route in the theory of 
traffic assignment to a transit network (Andreasson et al., 2016). In practice, it is often the 
case that a given line links together several regions: this is modeled here by splitting it into 
line sections according to location; the service duty fulfilled by line vehicle in a regional 
sector is attributed to the region’s vehicle times and vehicle fleet, again in an abstracted way. 
Concerning time periods, we refer here to a peak period in which service frequency is 
maximized, which determines fleet sizing. 
2.3 Travel demand 
Again as in a transit assignment model, let us represent travel demand as a set of trips made 
by travellers within the urban area. Origin-destination (O-D) pairs of regions are indexed by i  
and constitute a set denoted I . The origin region (resp. destination region) of i  is denoted +iz  
(resp. −iz ). 
Each individual user making one trip has a given walking speed, w , and specific sensitivity to 
access distance (code A), transfer distance or time (code T), wait time (code W) and run time 
(code R). Denote by X a generic code for trip stage, with Xit  (resp. 
X
id ) the associated time 
(resp. distance) in the trip: the user’s specific value of time is denoted Xiγ . Taking into 
account the O-D network tariff, iτ , as well as the money equivalent of spent times, the 
resulting generalized cost is denoted ig . 
At the aggregate level and during the period under study, the trips are characterized by O-D 
pair i  using the following attributes: 
+ trip flow denoted iQ  (so the flow rate is H/iQ  during the period). 
+ by component r , the input flow from region to mode (resp. output flow) is denoted riI   
(resp. riO ): it takes value 0 if the component’s region differs from the region of trip origin 
(resp. destination), whereas for ),( zmr =  it holds that im izm QI =∑ ∈M ),(  if += iz z  (resp. 
im izm
QO =∑ ∈M ),(  if −= iz z ). 
+ by pair ),( sr  of components, the number of trips with O-D pair i  passing from r  to s  is 
denoted irs
i
rs
i
rs MMM
ˆ+= , in which irsM  accounts for transfers without line change whereas 
i
rsMˆ  accounts for transfers with line or mode change. 
+ irR
i
r
i
r MOA
ˆ+≡  where ∑ ∈≡ R ˆˆ s irsirR MM  is the number of alightings in r  due to segment i . 
+ iRr
i
r
i
r MIB
ˆ+≡  where ∑ ∈≡ R ˆˆ s isriRr MM  is the number of boardings in r  due to segment i . 
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These definitions enable us to deal with travel demand in an aggregate, macroscopic way, 
while paying some attention to space and especially O-D pairs. The associated indicators can 
be derived by e.g. statistical analysis of a household travel survey for the urban area. 
We may consider trip flows iQ  that respond to quality of service and fare on the basis of the 
generalized cost, via a demand function denoted iD . 
2.4 The usage of supply by demand 
Each individual trip contributes to the aggregate indicators of its O-D pair. To depict its path 
along the transit network, let us get again inspired by traffic assignment and decompose the 
path into legs, i.e. by walking sub-path or by line section between two stations of vehicle 
entry and exit. To account for transferring between regions along a “concrete” leg, we shall 
extend the definition of a leg by considering fictive stations at the points where the line 
crosses the frontier between two neighbouring regions. 
Let us denote: 
+ irΛ  the number of legs travelled in component r  by O-D pair i . 
+ irλ  the average travelled distance along such a leg. 
+ ir
i
r
i
rT λΛ= .  the traffic of demand segment i  in component r . 
Flow conservation is assumed to hold in the following way: 
+ by origin (resp. destination) region, i
i
R QI =  (resp. iiR QO = ). 
+ between neighbouring regions r  and s , the leg flow associated to segment i  is proportional 
to the segment flow and constitutes both the leg flow going from r  to s , and that coming in s 
from r . 
We also take demand behaviour concerning mode and path choice as exogenous, by assuming 
constant ratios i
i
r QI / , i
i
r QO / , i
i
sr QM /  (also with hats), i
i
r Q/Λ  and iir QB / . Such ratios will 
be hereafter denoted as Xrix  or 
X
rsix  by stage X in {A, E, T, R, W} along the trip sequence. Of 
course, this postulate imposes the topological structure of the utilized paths and makes it 
strongly dependent on the structure of the services supplied in the reference scenario of model 
application. 
2.5 Network access 
The access distance between trip endpoints and network stations plays an important, though 
external, role in transit quality of service. Three principles are postulated here: 
(1) that trip endpoints are evenly distributed across space, 
(2) that each user chooses the “nearest to endpoint” station of the selected mode in his region, 
(3) that the walk pathways make up a Manhattan grid. 
These principles enable us to derive the statistical distribution of walking distance in the 
following way. Let x  (resp. y ) denote the “longitudinal” (resp. “transversal”) distance 
between endpoint and station along the transit line (resp. perpendicular to it). From principle 
(2), x  is uniformly distributed in [ ]S
2
1,0  (recall that S  denotes station spacing). 
Let also l  denote the line stretch spanning the region area A  in the dimension along the line 
axis, n  the number of such stretches in the region. Similarly, in the other dimension of space, 
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let lA/=h  be the spanning length (since l.A h=  under sufficiently rectangular region shape) 
and m  the number of stretches (Cf. figure 1): then y  is uniformly distributed in [ ]Y
2
1,0  
wherein nhY /=  is the spacing between neighboring parallel lines in that dimension.  
For a mode that spans the region in one dimension only, it holds that Ln =l.  so that 
 
LL
Y
AA
. ==
l
l
. (2.1) 
In this case we set the shape parameter rχ  to a value of 1 for the component.  
For a mode that spans the region in two dimensions with rectilinear enough lines, then 
Lhmn =+ ..l : if Yhn /=  and Ym /l=  then LY A/2= . Let then 2=χr . 
Whatever the case, the average access distance along the Manhattan grid satisfies the 
following functional relationship with respect to the component station spacing rS , line 
stretch rL , shape parameter rχ : 
 [ ] )A.(
4
1
yxE
r
rr
rAr
L
Sd
χ
+=+≡ . (2.2) 
 
Fig. 1. Access distance between trip endpoints and component stations. 
3. Causal relationships and model structure 
So far we have focused on basic definitions to describe the subsystems of Supply, Quality of 
Service and Demand on the basis of quantitative variables, which are “state variables” in the 
system model. We shall now link together the state variables by causal relationships that 
depict the influences between the variables as factors or outcomes. Each relationship involves 
one or several influences of variables as factors, onto one dependent variable. 
The set of variables, taken as nodes, together with the set of influences, taken as oriented links 
from factor to outcome, constitute a causal network that is the logical structure of our model. 
We shall illustrate the causal sub-network by subsystem, concerning respectively the supply 
side (§ 3.1), Quality of service (§ 3.2), Usage and demand (§ 3.3), Traffic interactions (§ 3.4). 
Lastly, putting together the sub-networks obtains the overall model structure (§ 3.5). 
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3.1 Supply side 
There are four causal relationships between the state variables that characterize a given mode 
in a given region: they determine respectively (1) station spacing, (2) access distance, 
(3) commercial vehicle speed, (4) service frequency. 
First, station spacing rS  depends on both the line length, rL , and the number of stations, rσ , 
since it satisfies that rrr LS =σ. . Thus, 
(Supply-1) 
r
r
r
L
S
σ
= . (3.1) 
Second, the accessibility of places to a given station at the region level is characterized by the 
average access distance to nearest station in the mode-region component: from (2.2), we have 
(Supply-2) )
A.
(
4
1
r
rr
rAr
L
Sd
χ
+= . (3.2) 
Third, the effective commercial speed that applies on average to all legs in component r , rv , 
depends on the free-flow running speed, denoted rV , and the dwell time by station, denoted 
rω . By unit of distance, there are on average rS/1  stations hence dwellings per service runs, 
so that 
(Supply-3) 
r
r
rr Sv
ω
+=
V
11
. (3.3) 
Fourth, service frequency rϕ  stems from line length rL , commercial speed rv  and the size 
rN  of the employed fleet. In a period of given duration H , the cycle time of a fictive, average 
vehicle for a return trip along the full component length amounts to 
(Supply-4a) 
r
r
r
v
L
C 2= . (3.4) 
There are H.rϕ  such cycles runs accomplished by the rN  vehicles, so that  
 rrr CN .H.H. ϕ= , (3.5) 
Which leads to 
(Supply-4b) 
r
rr
r
r
r
L
vN
C
N
2
==ϕ . (3.6)  
Taking rχ , rV  and rω  as exogenous parameters, the three variables rL , rσ  and rN  are basic 
in the sense that they determine the other variables while being mutually independent. Figure 
2 depicts the influences on the supply side in a network structure. It also shows the transfer 
distance Trsd  that applies to transfer steps in individual trips, which is here taken on average 
and as exogenous parameter. 
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Fig. 2. Causal relationships on the supply side. 
3.2 Quality of service 
A trip made by an individual user travelling on O-D pair i  involves access from origin point 
to network, egress from network to destination point, as well as running along line legs and 
waiting for each transit leg, plus transfer time for each (effective) transfer. The trip quality of 
service can be characterized by four kinds of user’s time spent on each kind of step, namely 
(1) Access or egress, (2) Waiting, (3) Running, (4) Transfer. 
First, access time A,irt  (resp. egress time 
E
,irt ) depends on access distance 
A
rd  and also walking 
speed iw : 
(Quality-1) 
i
r
ir
w
d
t
A
A
, =  and 
i
r
ir
w
d
t
A
E
, = . (3.7) 
Second, the average wait time prior to boarding at a given station, denoted Wrt , depends on 
service frequency rϕ  in a straightforward way: 
(Quality-2) 
r
r
rt
ϕ
β
=
2
W . (3.8) 
This formula holds for 1=βr  depicting perfectly regular service headways between 
successive vehicles. Reciprocally, for “memoryless” service with exponentially distributed 
headways, it holds that rrt ϕ= /1W , which justifies value 2=βr  to depict that case. 
Third, leg run time R,irt  involves leg length, 
i
rλ , and commercial speed, rv , in a simple way: 
on average 
(Quality-3) 
r
i
r
ir
v
t
λ
=R, . (3.9) 
Fourth, let us denote T ,irst  an average transfer time. For an i -bound user transferring from 
component r  to component s , it depends typically on the walk distance Trsd  and the walking 
speed of the users, iw : 
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(Quality-4) 
i
rs
irs
w
d
t
T
T
, = . (3.10) 
Relationships (Quality-1-4) depict quality of service in terms of user times. They are 
illustrated on Figure 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Causal relationships for Quality of service. 
3.3 Demand side 
In microeconomic theory, the “demand function” relates the volume of demand for a desired 
good to its price and, eventually, quality factors. As concerns transportation, quality of service 
plays a major role so that the dominant model involves a demand function in two steps: first, 
the evaluation of a “generalized cost” that synthesizes the price and the quality of service 
factors into a single value meaningful to the individual user, second, linking the generalized 
cost to the demand volume by a specific relationship. 
Here we shall keep to this two-step demand model. Denoting by Xiγ  the value of time 
associated to each time unit spent in a given state X in {A/E, W, T, R} (standing for 
Access/Egress, Wait, Transfer, Running, respectively) by a user on segment i , on average to 
such users the generalized cost of a trip amounts to  
(Demand-1) RRWR
WT
RR,
TE
R
E
R
A
iiiiiiiiiiii tttttg γ+γ+γ+γ+γ+τ= Α . (3.11) 
Wherein iτ  is the tariff and the following times are average quantities: 
 ( ) ir riiri QtIt /RR ∑ ∈ ΑΑ = . (3.12) 
 ( ) ir riiri QtOt /R EER ∑ ∈= . (3.13) 
 ( ) ir riri QtBt /R WWR ∑ ∈= . (3.14) 
 ( ) ir riri QvTt //RRR ∑ ∈= . (3.15) 
 ( ) isr irsirsi QtMt /ˆR, T ,TRR ∑ ∈= . (3.16) 
Then, the demand function iD  relates demand volume iQ  to ig : 
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(Demand-2) )(D iii gQ = . (3.17) 
The Assignment ratios { }QTQMQBQOQIxri /,/ˆ,/,/,/X ∈  are taken as exogenous for each 
demand segment. So, the dependence of the flow quantities { }TMBOIFri ,ˆ,,,X ∈  on iQ  and 
the respective ratios Xrix  amounts to an assignment function that can be denoted in a generic 
way as follows: 
(Demand-3) iriri QxF .
XX = . (3.18) 
Figure 4 depicts the sub-network of causal influences for the demand side. 
 
Fig. 4. Causal relationships concerning Demand. 
3.4 From Usage to Traffic conditions 
Let us now turn to the features of traffic that stem from the aggregation of individual trips into 
local flows on network elements. Such flows meet service capacity of two kinds: first, at 
station dwelling of transit vehicles, second aboard these vehicles. 
On average over lines and stations in a component during the period under study, the dwelling 
time spent by a vehicle at a station depends on the numbers of boarding and alighting 
passengers, respectively, and also on the exchange capacity of the vehicle, denoted ABrk  and 
counted as the number of passenger channels along a vehicle side (i.e. number of doors times 
their average number of passenger streams). 
As there are rrϕσ  such dwelling stops per unit time and traffic direction, the average number 
of boarding people per station and line and direction amounts to the following: 
 H)/(I rrrr Bb ϕσ= , wherein ∑ ∈≡ II i irr BB . (3.19) 
Similarly, the average number of alighting people per stop amounts to: 
 H)/(I rrrr Aa ϕσ= , wherein ∑ ∈≡ II i irr AA . (3.20) 
Assuming individual passage time of arp  or 
b
rp  on average for alighting and boarding, 
respectively, the overall passenger time spent at exchange adds up to brr
a
rr pbpa +  and is split 
between the passenger channels of the vehicle, yielding vehicle dwell time as follows: 
(Traffic-1) 
AB
r
b
rr
a
rr
rr
k
pbpa +
+ω=ω 0 , (3.21) 
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Wherein 0rω  is a fixed, minimum time that accounts for reduced speed at deceleration then 
acceleration as well as for door opening and closing. 
Aboard the vehicle, the average passenger flow determines both seat availability and the 
standing area available on average per standing passenger. Let us denote: 
+ ry  the average passenger load per vehicle in component r , which is split into r
y  seated 
passengers and ry  standing passengers, 
+ rk  the seat capacity aboard a vehicle in component r  and rk  the standing capacity, 
In the component during the study period of length H, the vehicles travel a total distance of 
HrrvN  while users from segment i  travel a total distance of 
i
rT , so it comes out that 
 
H
I
rr
r
r
vN
T
y = , with ∑ ∈= II i irr TT . (3.22) 
From this stems the seated density 
r
ρ  and the standing density rρ , respectively: 
 






=ρ
r
r
rr k
y
U ,min , (3.23) 
 
r
rrr
r
k
ky +ρ−
=ρ
)(
. (3.24) 
In these formulas, coefficient rU  would have value 1 were the passengers evenly distributed 
among the vehicle runs and between the stations and along the vehicles. A value less than 1 
can be given to take unevenness into account. 
It thus remains to account for local densities in passenger discomfort, by way of specific cost 
functions Rrγ  and Rrγ : 
(Traffic-2) 
r
rrrrrrrrr
r
y
kyk )()()( RR
R
ργρ−+ργρ
=γ . (3.25) 
Another capacity phenomenon may be of interest: that of track capacity, especially for 
railway modes. A relevant indicator is track reservation rη  due to both track occupancy at 
station dwelling and safety margins: on average, denoting by rϖ  a minimum headway time 
taken as safety margin between successive vehicles, it holds that. 
 ).( rrrr ϖ+ωϕ=η . (3.26) 
This is bound to influence vehicle running speed, through a specific relationship as follows: 
(Traffic-3) )(VˆV rrr η= . (3.27) 
Figure 5 illustrates the sub-network of causal relationships for traffic phenomena. Additional 
traffic phenomena could be modelled, for instance the increase of passenger wait time for 
vehicle boarding when the ratio of boarding flow to the product of exchange capacity by the 
system time allowed for boarding approaches 1.  
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Fig. 5. Causal relationships concerning Usage and Traffic. 
 
3.5 Model architecture 
By subsystem, we have identified the model elements and the causal relationships that put 
them in straightforward interaction; a graphical synthesis has been provided. We can now 
bring together the subsystems: this is done graphically, too, by the diagram in Figure 6 (which 
provides justification for the pre-set positions in the previous diagrams by subsystem). The 
overall diagram displays the model architecture that mimics the system’s logical structure. 
The diagram also demonstrates the system complexity and the pragmatic need to model it in 
order to manage it. 
The model architecture constitutes an important outcome of our systemic analysis. We have 
made the causal influences explicit in it so as to respect the “complexity of meaning” inherent 
to the system. The systemic diagram of Van Nes and Bovy (2000) was a useful reference: 
however it does not include the technical relationships and it represents the supply side in 
terms of “network spatial properties” such as spatial accessibility, instead of action levers 
such as fleet size.  
Complementarily, we have endeavoured to reduce the “complexity of abundance” by taking a 
statistical, generic approach to detailed features such as point location, modal elements, 
individual passengers and their trips. This approach stems straightforwardly from previous 
analytical studies at Delft Technical University in the 1990s and 2000s (Van Nes, 2002). 
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Fig. 6. Causal diagram of the model. 
 
4. Economic analysis 
At that stage, the causal model is above all a technical one as it describes the system elements 
and their straightforward interactions. It has also some economic significance on the demand 
side since users’ individual generalized costs are modelled and determine demand volumes. In 
this Section, we set up the economic rationale for network management by turning to 
economic impacts and agents (§ 4.1) and identifying values (§ 4.2) and costs (§ 4.3) to them. 
We then build up the function of system cost that synthesizes the system technical and 
economic performance (§ 4.4). 
4.1 System impacts as stakes for economic agents 
Two kinds of economic agents are primarily involved in system operations and performance: 
on the demand side the individual users can make use of services and benefit from their 
availability, whereas on the supply side there are service providers (say operators) that 
combine the technical means (infrastructure, vehicles and operations) in order to deliver the 
commercial services. 
In fact, the system impacts are not limited to its technical and commercial operations. We 
have identified the issues of tariffs that cost to the users but yield commercial revenues to the 
suppliers, of service quality that benefits to the users yet involves technical means hence 
impose costs to the operators, of passenger traffic that interplays with productive operations. 
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Fig. 7. Synthesis of system impacts and agents. 
Fig. 7 summarizes the model architecture in these respects and introduces two additional 
categories of economic agents, namely the Environment and the Productive sphere. As is 
well-known (e.g. Combes and Leurent, 2016), transportation – especially traffic operations – 
exerts a series of impacts on the environment: at the local level, there are pollutant emissions 
from thermic motors and noise emissions, the consumption of energy and matters, whereas at 
the global level there is the contribution to greenhouse gases together with other broad 
consequences of resource depletion and pollution of natural resources (soil, water, air). These 
impacts are external to the interaction between supply and demand: they concern the 
Community as a whole, as the environmental quality is important in the Quality of life and its 
sustainability. Although the Community of course includes the service users, it may be better 
thought of as the set of residents that avail themselves of the environmental conditions locally 
and benefit from Quality of life.  
As concerns the Productive sphere, it should be kept in mind that the money flows that stem 
from operators’ expenditure hence as costs to them go to other economic agents as 
commercial revenues, hence as value streams (e.g. Leurent and Windisch, 2015). The relevant 
set of agents includes not only the resource providers (infrastructure builders, vehicle makers, 
maintenance, cleaning, energy provision…) but also the employees of the transportation firms 
that belong to the Community and get wages as income to them. The interaction between the 
transportation system and the Productive sphere is a system externality of socio-economic 
kind. 
For the sake of simplicity we shall hereafter restrict our scope to Supply and Demand in 
interaction. However the two broad kinds of externalities, environmental versus 
socioeconomic, should be included in further analysis to better compare alternative transit 
modes in a truly multicriteria framework. 
4.2 Agents’ Values 
By demand segment i.e. here by O-D pair i , the generalized cost to an individual user may be 
expressed in a generic way as follows: 
 ∑ γ+τ= X XXX xtg ii , (4.1) 
In which the summation over X denotes the different stages along a trip (Access / Egress, 
Wait, Run, eventual Transfers). The cost of each stage is basically a time cost Xγ  multiplied 
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by a physical time XX xt  in which Xx  is an assignment factor. Index i  as well as the location 
details (components, transfers within / between components) have been omitted in the 
summation so as to preserve legibility. The money part of the cost, iτ , might also be 
decomposed along the trip sequence, were the tariff based on the effective usage. 
In transport economics, it is fairly standard to take the generalized cost as the argument of the 
demand function, which is the basic tool to evaluate consumer surplus. 
As an elemental demand Qδ  just above level )D(GQ =  would take the service at cost 
GG δ−  but not at cost G , its own gross surplus belongs to [ ])(D),(D )1()1( QQQ −− δ+  - say it 
amounts to )(D )1( Q− , while the net surplus at cost G  is null. As the full demand of the 
segment is made up of all elements with disaggregate gross surplus higher than G , its 
aggregate gross surplus is the following: 
 ∫ −= i
Q
ii qq0
)1( d)(DGUS , (4.2) 
with associated aggregate net surplus of: 
 ∫
∞=−≡
iG
iiiii ggGQ d)(D.GUSNUS . (4.3) 
By adding up the segment gross (resp. net) surplus over the demand segments I∈i , we obtain 
the global demand gross (resp. net) surplus. 
As concerns the operators, the primary source of value for them consists in the commercial 
revenues from paid fees, i.e. ∑ ∈ τIi iiQ . This is often supplemented by government subsidies 
and always diminished by taxes. 
Let us take a net-of-tax approach: as subsidies are often related to usage, they constitute 
additional revenues analogous to those from tariff fees. The combined value of commercial 
fare iτ  and the “related” subsidy iτ∆  may be denoted iτ′ , so that the net-of-tax operators’ 
revenue amounts to 
 ∑∈ τ′= INOR i iiQ . (4.4) 
4.3 Agents’ Costs 
The subsidizing authority bears a cost of iτ∆  per trip on segment i , so it bears an aggregate 
cost of 
 ∑ ∈ τ∆= IAC i iiQ . (4.5) 
Each user according to his segment i  incurs a generalized cost of ig . By aggregation, users’ 
generalized costs amount to 
 ∑ ∈= IGUC i ii gQ . (4.6) 
The tariff part of that can be called also the money costs to users, 
 ∑ ∈ τ= IMUC i iiQ . (4.7) 
Net of tariffs, the users’ costs are time-based costs: 
 ∑ ∑∑ ∈ ∈∈ γ=τ−= I XR, XXXI )(TUC i r riririii iii txQgQ . (4.8) 
On their side, operators bear production costs that include holding costs for the purchase or 
hiring and the maintenance of their production means, together with operational costs for the 
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means’ utilization, which involves the consumption of consumable goods such as energy. We 
shall analyse the operators’ costs primarily with respect to cost-inductors i.e. by kind of 
means either linear infrastructure or station or vehicle. 
The associated cost inductors are the supply-related variables, rL , rσ  and rN , respectively. 
The distinction of the component enables us to specify the mode and also the region in the 
urban area, in order to emphasize the cost of ground space which is higher in more central 
places. At this stage, we associate unit costs denoted Lrc , rσc  and Nrc  to each basic supply 
variable taken by period of length H. Every such unit cost involves holding (capital) as well 
as utilization (operations) costs. The resulting operators’ costs can be evaluated by 
component, 
 rNrrrrLrr NL .c.c.cOC +σ+= σ , (4.9) 
 and aggregated other all transit modes and the whole urban area as follows: 
 ∑∑ ∈ σ∈ +σ+== RR .c.c.cOCOC r rNrrrrLrr r NL . (4.10) 
4.4 System costs 
Let us now sum up the costs minus the values to all of the agents in the system – authority, 
users and operators, under the limitations mentioned earlier about which impacts are here 
considered. 
The authority bears costs AC as stated in (4.5), neglecting both environmental costs and the 
values yielded to the community by taxes, impositions, accessibility advantages and effects on 
the productive sphere. The users benefit from gross surplus GUS that aggregates those of the 
demand segments as stated in (4.2), 
 ∑ ∫∑ ∈
−
∈ == I 0
)1(
I d)(DGUSGUS i
Q
ii i
i qq , (4.11) 
By subtracting users’ costs GUC given in (4.6), the net users’ surplus amounts to: 
 ∑ ∫∑ ∈
∞
∈ == II d)(DNUSNUS i G ii i i gg . (4.12) 
The operators get commercial and subsidized revenues of NOR and bear costs OC, so their 
net profit amounts to  
 OCNOROP −= . (4.13) 
The overall system cost is defined as the sum of its agents’ costs net from the surpluses and 
revenues, i.e.: 
 OPNUSACSC −−= ,  
 OCORNGUSGUCACSC +−−−+= ,  
 GUSOCTUCSC −+= , (4.14) 
Since OR is compensated in AC and the money costs to the users, MUC = GUC – TUC. 
Function SC encompasses the overall net costs of the transit system under the exogenous 
structure of demand and the supply set-ups (the basic variables rL , rσ , rN , iτ  and the 
derived variables). Thus it is taken as the objective function to be minimized in order to 
optimize system planning. 
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5. User equilibrium and system optimization 
Having modelled economic agents with the values and costs to them, we are now ready to 
study their joint behaviour and the scope for system management. To do that, we shall first 
synthesize the model even further owing to some mathematical formalization (§ 5.1); this 
enables us to deal with the determination of the endogenous system state on the basis of an 
exogenous supply plan (§ 5.2). Then we address the issue of system optimization by 
providing an analytical scheme to determine an optimal supply plan (§ 5.3). 
5.1 Mathematical synthesis 
Whereas the causal model in fact a synthesis of the technical features of the system, the unit 
costs constitute a synthesis of many economic features. Figure 8 encompasses the technical 
and economic features so far studied. The block diagram in it characterizes the 
straightforward influences between the system characteristics. By chaining influences along 
sequences, e.g. from supply variables rS  of station spacing, to users’ waiting times 
W
rit , 
passing by commercial speed rv , cycle time rC  and service frequency rϕ , we can identify 
influence paths. In other words, figure 8 depicts the topological structure of influences within 
the system. 
The vector of supply variables, [ ]IRABX )(,),,,,,,( ∈∈ τβσ= iirrrrrrrr kkkNLS , is controlled by 
the operator: hence the X subscript, standing for Exogenous. The rest of the supply variables 
constitute the vector of Endogenous supply characteristics, denoted NS  with subscript N: 
[ ]R,TRAN )(,),,,,,( ∈∈ωϕ= srrsrrrrrrr ddvCSS  : it depends on XS  and also on the vector of traffic 
variables, [ ]R),,,,,,,( ∈ρρη= rrrrrrrrr yyybaT . 
 
Fig. 8. Diagrammatic model of technical and economic system. 
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Let us also define: 
[ ]IisrirsIirriririri ttttt ∈∈∈∈= R,,T ,R,WREA )(,),,,(t  
[ ]IisrirsIirriririri ∈∈∈∈ γγγγγ= R,,T ,R,WREA )(,),,,(Γ  
[ ]Iiig ∈= )(g  
[ ]IiiQ ∈= )(Q  
The combined vector [ ]Γ= ,,,,,, NX QgtTSSV  constitutes the state vector of the system. XS  
is its exogenous part, whereas the rest of the vector, denoted as NV , is endogenous. 
Let us now use vector notation and mathematical functions to described the modeled 
influences in a still more synthetic way: denoting [ ]NX ,SSS = , 
( )TSFS ,XSNN =  is the supply function,   (5.1a) 
)(t SFt =  is the user time function,   (5.1b) 
),(T QSFT =  is the traffic function,   (5.1c) 
)(TFΓ Γ=  is the comfort function,   (5.1d) 
)(Q gFQ =  is the demand function,   (5.1e) 
),,(g Γ= tτFg  the user cost function,   (5.1f) 
it involves τ  that belongs to XS  while the rest of S  exert indirect influences via t . 
The system of equations (5.1) is illustrated in figure 9 and may be put as a unified function  
 ),( NXVNN VSFV = . (5.2) 
 
Fig. 9. Synthetic diagram of influences. 
5.2 On User and Traffic Equilibrium 
Eqn (5.2) synthesizes in a formal way the mutual interaction between the subsystems. It 
constitutes a Fixed Point Problem (FPP) with respect to endogenous state vector NV . The 
FPP characterizes an equilibrium state between supply, traffic and demand, which is akin to 
the notion of Traffic equilibrium or User equilibrium in the theory of network traffic 
assignment. Thus, the system state appears as a solution of an FPP of User and Traffic 
Equilibrium (UTE). Despite an important part of the supply state is endogenous, we avoid to 
call such a solution state a supply-demand equilibrium because it captures the technical 
determination of supply but not its economic behaviour. 
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The determination of an UTE raises the issues of the existence and uniqueness of solutions to 
the FPP. Loosely speaking, a mathematical proof of existence involves some smoothness 
property of mapping VNF ; this is likely to hold since the constituent elementary functions are 
continuous almost everywhere. A proof of uniqueness could be based on a property of 
contraction for the mapping. Both issues, however, are left aside for further research with 
more mathematical orientation. Hereafter we shall take the two issues as granted.  
An important case where this holds obviously is the Uncongested case such that the variations 
in traffic conditions T  entail variations neither in Γ  nor in S . Then, the state determination 
involves no feedback loops (Cf. figure 10) and is thus straightforward. 
 
Fig. 10. Synthetic diagram of the uncongested model. 
5.3 On System Optimization 
The mathematical synthesis enables us to study the issue of system optimization in an 
analytical way. 
System Optimum Problem (SOP): minimize System costs SC with respect to “exogenous 
supply” state vector XS , subjected to technical and economic relationships in mapping VNF : 
 Min ),SC( NX VS   submitted to  ),( NXVNN VSFV = . (5.3) 
In other words, by solving the mathematical program (5.3) we obtain the optimum levels of 
supply provision either basic (infrastructure length, station number, fleet size, capacities, 
tariffs) or derived (station spacing, access distances, commercial speed, service frequency). 
A robust approach to solve this kind of problem is to relax the constraints by associating 
“dual” variables [ ]QgttTSN ,,,,,, µµµµµµµ≡ Γμ  to each part of them. Assuming that mapping 
VNF  is differentiable, system optimization requires the following “primal-dual optimality 
conditions” to hold: 
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),(
0).(SC
NXVNN
VN
VSFV
FUμ
=
=∇−∇+∇
. (5.4) 
Wherein NN: VVU a , SC∇  and VNF∇  are taken with respect to V , U∇  w.r.t NV . 
The primal-dual optimality conditions yield the advantages of a smooth enough state vector 
and differentiable functions VNF  and SC. This is an important advantage over the discrete 
approach to network design, on both analytical and numerical grounds. Of course the discrete 
approach is superior when it comes to providing detailed features such as the particular 
location of lines or stations. 
The mathematical treatment here is somewhat loose and mostly indicative. We are more 
interested in the model relevance for planning policies. In fact, policy considerations are 
likely to impose additional constraints, such as  
),(),( 00 rrrr LL σ≥σ   To capitalize over system history, 
0
rr ϕ≥ϕ    To enhance the local level of service, 
max
ArAr dd ≤   To satisfy a requirement of local accessibility in space. 
Along with specific political requirements, the major planning issue comes to which action 
levers are available: for instance, is it feasible to build additional lines, or to vary the tariffs? 
 
6. The uncongested model: economic theory 
Our aim here is to address system optimization of the uncongested model and establish some 
theoretical properties linking the variables (hence the system features in quantitative terms) of 
interest. These properties stem from optimality conditions by suitable reinterpretation with 
respect to the variables “under control” on the supply side. A companion objective is to 
establish the existence and uniqueness of an optimal system state, together with an efficient 
and straightforward solution scheme. 
After stating the economic program of system optimization and its primal-dual conditions of 
optimality (§ 6.1), we focus on demand flows and tariff optimization (§ 6.2). Then, we deal 
with the quality of service characteristics that play a crucial role and enable us to separate the 
supply side by network component (§ 6.3). Next, we address the analytical determination of, 
successively frequency and fleet size (§ 6.4), the number and spacing of stations (§ 6.5), 
commercial speed and line length (§ 6.6). To each range of issues is associated a specific 
relationship of theoretical interest. We then put together the three relationships and emphasize 
their economic meaning (§ 6.7). Lastly, we establish theoretical properties of existence and 
uniqueness for a System Optimum State and outline the solution scheme (§ 6.8): the detailed 
material is given in a specific appendix (cf. Section 9). 
6.1 Economic program with primal-dual optimality conditions 
The economic program for system optimization involves an objective function SC and a set of 
constraints as follows: 
∑ ∫∑
∈
−
∈
σ −τ−++σ+≡
I
0
)1(
R
d)(D)(.c.c.cSC
i
Q
iiii
r
rNrrrrLr
i qqgQNL , (6.1) 
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  with associated multiplier vrµ , R∈∀r , (6.3) 
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rr
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=ϕ   with associated multiplier rϕµ , R∈∀r , (6.4) 
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1A
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rr
rr
L
Sd
χ
+=   with associated multiplier Arµ , R∈∀r , (6.5) 
∑ ∈ γ+τ= XR, XXXr riririii txg , I∈∀i .  (6.6) 
)(D iii gQ = , I∈∀i .  (6.7) 
We shall deal with user costs ig  and demand flows iQ  in a straightforward way, without 
associating specific multipliers to them. In the uncongested case, we take the discomfort costs 
X
riγ  as constant, as well as dwell times rω  and reference speeds rV . 
We also include a budgetary constraint to compel the system users to contribute to its funding  
at a floor level pre-set to SR (for Supply Revenue), 
 SRI ≥τ∑∈i iiQ ,  with associated multiplier 0B ≥µ . (6.8) 
Precisely, the economic program consists in: 
 Min SC with respect to II )( ∈τ≡ iiτ , RR )( ∈≡ rrLL , Rσ , RN , RS , Rϕ , Rv  and ARd , (6.9) 
 under constraints (6.2-8). 
To relax the constraints, we consider the Lagrangian function of the optimization program, 
namely 
{ }∑
∑
∈
χω
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+−µ+−−µ+−ϕµ+−µ+
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μμμμdvSNσLτ
 (6.10) 
The primal-dual conditions for optimality basically consist in equating to zero the first-order 
derivatives of the Lagrangian function – with a little more sophisticated treatment for the 
inequality constraint (6.8): 
 x
x
variableprimalanyfor0
£
=
∂
∂
, (6.11a) 
 Bthanothervariabledualanyfor
£
µµ0=
µ∂
∂
, (6.11b) 
 0B ≥µ ,  0≤
µ∂
∂
B
£
  and  0=
µ∂
∂
µ
B
B
£
. . (6.11c) 
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6.2 Demand flows and tariff setting 
In a formal way, let us calculate 
.byDdenotingand)(Dsince)1(
d)(DNUSwith)NUS(
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Now, as iτ  contributes to the Lagrangian function both per se and via ig , we derive that 
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System optimization with respect to tariffs requires that 0/d£d =τi , hence that 
 
i
i
i
Q
Q
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B
B
1 µ+
µ
−=τ . (6.12) 
 which is compatible with non-negative tariffs since 0B ≥µ  and iQ&  can be expected to be 
negative. Denoting by iii gQ ln/dlnd≡ε  the elasticity of demand volume to individual cost, 
then iiii gQQ // ε=&  so the previous condition can be put as 
 
i
i
i
g
εµ+
µ
−=τ
B
B
1
. (6.13) 
The main implication is that iii QQ BB )1( µ−=τµ+ & , so that 
 iii
i
QQQ
g
µ=µ+=
∂
∂
B
£
,  
Wherein B1 µ+≡µ . 
This enables us to deal with both elastic demand and variable demand in a unified framework, 
since under fixed demand iD  is constant so that ii Qg =∂∂ /£ , which is compatible with 
(6.13) by setting µ  to value 1. Then, the relationship B1 µ+=µ  induces that Bµ  is set to 
zero, in due consistency with the irrelevance of the tariffs as drivers of the system state and 
the neutralization of the budget requirement. 
Under variable demand, the relationship between iτ  and ig  can be restated as follows, letting 
iii g τ−≡θ  denote the time-based part in the generalized cost: 
 iiii εθ+τµ−=τµ /)).(1( , 
Hence, iii θ=τ−
−µ
µ
ε− )1
1
( . (6.14) 
If demand elasticity is constant and uniform among demand segments, then aggregation over 
them yields a linear relationship between MUC and TUC, namely: 
 MUC)1
1
(TUC −
−µ
µ
ε−= , with ∑∈ θ≡ ITUC i iiQ  and ∑∈ τ≡ IMUC i iiQ .  
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Under fairly common value of 6.−=ε , we can expect that TUC and MUC would be of 
similar order of magnitude at system optimum. 
Another consequence of (6.14) concerns the value of the dual parameter µ : as both iτ  and iθ  
are expected to be positive, then so is their ratio, leading to 01>+µ−µε− i  for every I∈i , 
hence to 
 
M1
1
ε+
<µ , with { }I:infM ∈ε=ε ii .  
Value 6.M −=ε  yields an upper bound of 5.2U =µ  on µ . 
Table 2. First-order derivatives of Lagrangian function. 
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6.3 Quality of service in quantitative terms 
Quality of service to system users is modelled by the time spent in a series of stages, X in 
{A, W, R, E, T} where letter A stands for Access, E for Egress, R for Run, W for Wait and T 
for Transfer. We shall omit Transfer times and focus on X in {A, E, R, W} and the associated 
characteristic times Xrt  spent in a given component r . Characteristic times are useful as 
intermediary variables between the supply-side factors and the objective function as well as 
the associated Lagrangian function. Let us then calculate the partial derivatives of the 
modified objective function SR))(D(SCSC
I
B
# −τµ−≡ ∑
∈i
iii g  with respect to characteristic 
times. 
Notionally,  
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In which the Xrix  are the assignment factors and each 
X
riγ  represents discomfort cost per time 
unit. So the Right Hand Side in (6.15) is a value of time aggregated over all users in 
component r . 
As for wait time,  
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W
#SC
r
i
ririi
r
ExQ
t
µ=γµ=
∂
∂
∑
∈
, (6.16) 
Wherein ∑∈ γ≡ I WW i irir BE . We shall refer to WrE  as the Effect of waiting time in the 
component. 
Concerning run time per unit distance, the characteristic variable is rr vt /1
R ≡  so that 
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Wherein ∑∈ γ≡ I RR i irir TE . 
As for Access and Egress times, the demand segments may exhibit different speeds, so the 
characteristic variable of major interest is the access distance is Ard  by component r . It holds 
that by demand segment, letting ii
Q
iiii QqqgQ
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Thus, with respect to the access distance, as SRSCSC BI
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, (6.18) 
 wherein ∑∈ γ+γ≡ I EAA /)(i iiriirir wOIE  is the indicator of effect for terminal distance onto 
system cost. 
To sum up, each indicator of effect is an economic value derived by aggregation over the 
demand segments. 
6.4 Service frequency and fleet size 
About fleet size rN , we have that 
 
r
r
rNr
r L
v
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So the related optimality condition, 0/£ =∂∂ rN , yields that 
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In which we recognize the cycle time rC . 
As for service frequency rϕ , as 
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The optimality condition 0/£ =ϕ∂∂ r  amounts to 
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Or equivalently to 
r
rr
r
E
ϕµ
βµ
=ϕ
2
W
2 . (6.23) 
The quadratic dependence of frequency onto a demand aggregate under system optimization 
is a well-known property for the operations of transit lines (Small and Verhoef, 2007). 
Combining (6.20) and (6.23) to the dual optimality condition with respect to rϕµ , namely 
0/£ =µ∂∂ ϕr  wherein rrrrr LvN 2//£ −ϕ≡µ∂∂ ϕ , we get that 
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Hence that 
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N
E
c2
Wβµ
=ϕ . (6.24) 
Which links the optimum frequency to the operator cost of the rolling stock, rNr Nc . 
Indeed this is a remarkable economic property, as is evidenced by the following equivalent 
form,  
 W
W
UC
2
c r
r
rr
rNr
E
N µ=
ϕ
βµ
= . 
Put in words, under system optimization the operator cost of the rolling stock, rNr Nc , is 
balanced by the user cost of waiting, denoted WUCr , since 
W
rE  is the aggregate time value of 
a unit waiting time while rr ϕβ 2/  is the average individual waiting time. The balancing is 
exact under fixed demand ( 1=µ ), whereas under variable demand it involves 1≥µ  as a lever 
arm on the demand side. 
In the solution scheme, eqn. (6.24) will be used as the following relationship between rL , rv  
and rN : 
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6.5 On station number and spacing 
Coming to the number of stations rσ  in the network component, we have that 
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So the optimality condition associated to rσ , namely 0/£ =σ∂∂ r , yields that 
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The partial derivative of the Lagrangian function with respect to station spacing rS  is 
 Ar
r
r
vrSr
r SS
µ−
ω
µ+µ≡
∂
∂
4
1
2
£
. (6.28) 
Thus the related optimality condition, 0/£ =∂∂ rS , relates the dual variables and rS . We will 
use it in the following form, wherein Srµ  is replaced by rrr L/c 2σ− σ  using (6.27): 
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As regards the terminal distance, Ard , the partial derivative of the Lagrangian function with 
respect to it  is 
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So the related optimality condition, 0/£ =∂∂ Ard , states that  
 ArAr Eµ−=µ . (6.31) 
Using the dual condition, 0/£ =µ∂∂ Sr , under system optimization it holds that rrr LS σ= / , 
so that (6.28) is equivalent to the following 
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This is indeed a second remarkable economic property, which states that under system 
optimization the operator’s cost of stations balances the “longitudinal” part of the users’ costs 
of walking, up to the partial effect of station spacing onto commercial speed and a lever arm 
of 1≥µ  on the demand side. The equality )/A(
4
1A
rrrrr LSd χ+=  is ensured by the dual 
optimality condition associated to the dual variable rAµ , 0/£ A =µ∂∂ r . 
6.6 Commercial speed and infrastructure length 
Concerning commercial speed rv , the partial derivative of the Lagrangian function is  
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On replacing rϕµ  by 2W 2/ rrrE ϕβµ  and rϕ  by rrr LvN 2/ , the optimality condition related to 
rv , 0/£ =∂∂ rv , yields that 
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For this condition to hold true it requires that 0<µvr . 
From (6.32): 
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Gathering (6.32) and (6.34), we obtain that 
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Which is the operational form of the second property in the solution scheme. 
As for infrastructure length rL , the related partial derivative of the Lagrangian function is 
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In the related optimality condition, 0/£ =∂∂ rL , we shall replace Srµ  by rrr L2c σ− σ , rϕµ  by 
rrNr vL /2c  and Arµ  by ArEµ−  to get that  
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Or equivalently, 
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This constitutes the third remarkable economic property under system optimization: the full 
operator costs (Left Hand Side in the equality) balances the transversal part of the users’ costs 
of walking, up to a lever arm of 1≥µ  on the demand side. Under fixed demand it holds that 
1=µ  hence the matching is perfect and it means that the Time User Costs are quite greater 
than the Operator Costs in the full System Cost. 
Consequently, a fare policy requiring the users to cover the full costs of supply might be quite 
tolerable to them, since the related fee would only constitute a minor part in the individual 
generalized cost. 
6.7 A synthesis of conditions for system equilibrium 
To sum up, the primal-dual optimality conditions for the modelled transit system with no 
congestion amount to a net of 3R+1 relationships between three basic supply variables by 
network component, ( rL , rσ , rN ), and the dual variable µ  associated to a constraint of cost 
recovery. Let us gather them as a reduced set of conditions: 
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From (6.25): 
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From (6.35): 
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A basic vector [ ]µσ ∈ ,),,( Rrrrr NL  that solves the previous system enables one to derive all 
characteristics of a system state under system optimization. 
A couple of comments are in order here. First, under fixed demand we have 1=µ  so the 
reduced problem breaks into R problems each with three equations in three unknowns: then, 
system optimization is decentralized by network component.  
Second, under variable demand the dual variable µ  summarizes the coupling between the 
components, through the determination of the demand which puts the components in 
interaction (in a “weak form” of interaction, actually). 
Third, the integration of several components in a unified framework of system optimization 
induces inter-regional and inter-modal analogies: between any two components r  and s , a 
number of characteristic features must be proportionate, notably so: 
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Furthermore, all of these quantities are equal to µ  hence to one another in a given component 
as well as between components. 
Fourth and last, the equality between operator costs and the user cost of “transversal” access 
indeed constitutes a “golden rule” for transit networks, as it matches the cost of supply to the 
cost of transversal access, that for all trips in either a given component, or a specific area, or 
the multimodal network in the full urban area. So its spatial outreach goes far beyond the 
market area of a single line of transit. 
Let us summarize the three remarkable economic properties and emphasize their respective 
economic significance: 
[1] WUCc µ=rNr N  i.e. the cost of the rolling stock balances that of waiting, 
[2] A allongitudin
RW UC)
V
1)(UC.(UCc µ=−+µ+σσ
r
r
rr
v
 i.e. the users’ costs of longitudinal access 
is balanced by the station costs, plus the dwelling proportion of commercial time multiplied 
by the cost of in-system time to the users.. 
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[3] A ltransversaUCccc µ=+σ+ σ rNrrrrLr NL  i.e. the supply cost balances that of transversal 
access. 
The second relationship stems from (6.35), by replacing rrNr vNc  with 
WUCµrv  owing to [1] 
and also RrE  with 
RUCrv . Then, rrrrNr vEvN )UC.(UCc
RWR +µ=µ+ . Yet it does also hold 
that rrrrr vSv /V1/. −=ω  i.e. the proportion of “running time” that is spent at station dwelling. 
By adding up the two last relationships and remarking that AWR UCUCUCTUC ++=  (recall 
that the transfer costs were omitted), it comes out that 
AA UC)UC)(TUC
V
1(
cOC
=−−+
µ
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The total value of users’ access time is worth more than half the operator costs plus a fraction 
of the time users costs. Under variable demand and constant elasticity, MUCTUC
1
)1(1
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µε+−= , 
so that 
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6.8 Formal properties and solution scheme 
In the Appendix (Section 9), we provide a solution scheme, which enabled us to derive formal 
properties of existence and uniqueness for a System Optimum State, together with some 
properties of sensitivity analysis. Let us here outline the main outcomes. 
Proposition 1: Existence and uniqueness of a system optimum state under Fixed demand. 
Under “Fixed demand” defined as given parameter µ  and demand flows I):(I ∈= iQiQ , 
there exists a System Optimal state, which is unique. 
Under “Fixed demand” the System Optimum problem is separable and reduces to a reduced 
problem of 3 equations linking three reduced unknowns µ≡′ /LL , µσ≡σ′ /  and µ≡′ /NN . 
It turns out that station spacing S  is the main factor, with respect to whom the SO sub-
problem of the component reduces in a single equation in S  only. 
The single equation in S  amounts to match a function of S  that increases from zero to 
infinity, with a given value that is non-negative: thus the equation has one and one only 
solution. The solution depends on µ  and the demand flows IQ  (via the Effect factors) as 
parameters in a simple way, which enables us to derive the following property of sensitivity 
for the reduced optimal state ( SLˆ′ , SNˆ ′ , S ) and the reduced operator cost function, 
NccLcS ′+σ′+′≡′ σ NLCO : 
Proposition 2: Sensitivity analysis of optimum system state (under fixed demand).  
[i] The reduced system optimum solution ( SLˆ′ , SNˆ ′ , S ) decreases with µ  and so does the 
reduced operator cost, SCO ′ . [ii] With respect to region area A, the system optimum solution 
( SLˆ′ , SNˆ ′ , S ) increases and so does the reduced operator cost, SCO ′ . 
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Thus, under “Fixed Demand” it is easy to solve the problem of System Optimization. Under 
Variable demand, both µ  and the demand flows IQ  are endogenous as well as the supply 
side variables [ ]R:),,( ∈σ rNL rrr . We address the SO problem under Variable Demand as a 
three-level optimization program, with upper level to deal with µ , intermediary level to solve 
for IQ  and lower level to solve for the supply side variables on the basis of µ  and IQ . Of 
course the lower level consists in a Fixed Demand SO problem. 
The following Proposition holds true: 
Proposition 3: Existence and uniqueness of System Optimum State under Variable demand. 
Assuming that the target revenue SR is feasible, there exists a state of System Optimum for the 
transit system under variable demand. This state is unique. 
Our solution scheme to address the upper level problem consists in a dichotomy search on µ  
only so as to meet the condition of minimum commercial revenue. From each candidate value 
of µ , we derive the demand flows IQ  and the supply side variables that jointly satisfy all of 
the other conditions for optimality, by solving a Fixed Point Problem in IQ  which uses the 
Fixed Demand SO problem as a sub-program. Conditionally to µ , this Fixed Point Problem 
makes up the intermediary level in the overall, three-level scheme. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper owes much to previous contributions to the theory of transit network design. Our 
model of system elements and relationships essentially builds upon Van Nes (2002), whereas 
our synthetic diagram is both more detailed (adding up causal relationships and action levers) 
and more structured than the initial version (Van Nes and Bovy, 2000). We extended the 
model to deal with spatial heterogeneity (yet in a coarse way): this involves the distinction of 
regions within the study area and the identification of origin-destination pairs. Another 
theoretical extension pertains to traffic phenomena and their feedbacks on supply performance 
as well as on quality of service. Having stated the two related problems of, first, system state 
determination under exogenous supply set-ups and, second, state optimisation by acting on 
supply-side levers, we provided a theoretical study of system optimization. Three “golden 
rules” for the optimal design and management of urban transit networks have been established 
in a fairly generic framework (yet in the uncongested case). A fourth rule pertains to second 
best optimal tariffs under variable demand. Solution algorithms have been provided for the 
fixed demand case then for variable demand under a threshold constraint on commercial 
revenues. 
All in all, the strategic model is both technical and economic; it lies halfway of, on one hand, 
network traffic assignment models which feature out technical relationships and the supply-
demand interactions and, on the other hand, theoretical models in transport economics at the 
local or line or aggregate level. The generic framework allows for theoretical analysis. 
However it can support neither the spatial nor the temporal details that are required in the 
design of particular projects. 
Beyond system understanding, we believe that the model is suitable for practical applications, 
ranging from synthetic statistical description of an existing system, to the assessment of 
observed or hypothetical system states against a theoretically optimal state, passing by 
comparisons between network components within the system and also between the transit 
systems of different urban areas. 
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9. Appendix: solution scheme and formal properties 
In order to solve the problem of System Optimization, we designed a computation scheme 
that decomposes the problem in three layers: from bottom-up, the determination of supply-
side variables conditionally to dual parameter µ  and demand flows I):(I ∈= iQiQ , then the 
determination of demand flows IQ  conditionally to µ , and lastly the determination of µ  
itself. The lower layer constitutes the Fixed demand problem of System Optimization and it 
turns out to be separable by network component. 
The building-up of the solution scheme enables us to establish formal properties of existence 
and uniqueness of an SO state. These are obtained at first under Fixed demand, then under 
Variable demand. So the Section body is in two parts. Subsection 9.1 deals with the Fixed 
demand problem, its specific solution scheme and formal properties. Then, Subsection 9.2 
addresses Variable demand and the determination of the dual parameter µ  that has a key role. 
9.1 Algorithm for fixed demand and given dual parameter 
Here the dual variable µ  is taken as a parameter and the II )( ∈≡ iiQQ  are fixed. This approach 
includes the fixed demand case, in which µ  is set to 1 and the flows are fixed. In a more 
general setting, let us assume that µ  is fixed and also the demand volumes, hence the effect 
factors XrE  for all components r  in R. 
Thus, the reduced problem of system optimization (6.38)[1]-[3] is separable by component 
and consists in three non-linear equations in three unknowns (we drop index r  for 
simplicity): 
 [1’] 
W
2
Nc
E
Nv
L
β
′
=′   wherein  
Sv
ω
+=
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  and  
σ′
′
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L
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)(cc =
ω
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[3’] 
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NL
′
χ
µ
=′+σ′+′ σ
A
4
1
ccc
A
NL .  
In this re-statement, we have taken reduced variables µ≡′ /LL , µσ≡σ′ /  and µ≡′ /NN  
with respect to which there only remains one dependency on µ  viz. in the right hand side of 
[3’]. Furthermore, SLS =σ′′=′ /  and vv =′  so we shall focus on S  as the main variable, 
together with L′  and N′ . 
From [1’], L′  is fully determined by N′  and S  (through v ), so it can be denoted SNL ,ˆ ′′ . 
By substituting W2N /c ENvS β′  to L′  in [2’] via SL /′=σ′ , and multiplying by S , we get 
that 
R2A
4
1
N
2
W
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cc
ESENvN
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S ω−=′ω+′
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 0)(
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ESE
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N
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S
. (9.1)  
Which merely amounts to a second-order equation in N′  that is parameterized by S . 
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Denoting 
σ
βω
≡ξ
c
WE
 and )(
c
R2A
4
1
N
ESE
vS
S −
ξ
≡ζ ω , the equation reduces to 
 02 =ζ−′ξ+′ SNN . (9.2)  
The discriminant amounts to 
 Sζ+ξ=∆ 42 , (9.3)  
Which is non-negative iff SNvESE c4
R2A1 ξ−≥−ω , or )c4(
R2
A SNE
vES ξ−≥ ω . 
We shall satisfy ourselves with the stricter requirement that 0≥ζS  i.e. AR2 /4 EES ω≥  or 
 AR0 /2 EESS ω≡≥ . (9.4)  
Under this requirement, 2ξ≥∆  hence the second-order equation in N′  admits one 
nonnegative solution only, namely 
 SSN ψ
ξ
=
ξ−∆
=′
22
ˆ   with  1)(1 20
2
cN
A −−+≡ψ ωξ SSSv
E
S . (9.5)  
Replacing N′  by Sξψ2
1  in [1’], we obtain L′  as a function of S  only,  
 2
W
2
N
4
cˆ
S
S
S
E
v
L ψ
β
ξ
=′ . (9.6)  
In turn, SL /′=σ′  is a function of S  only, 
 
S
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SS
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4
c
ˆ
ψ
β
ξ
=σ′ . (9.7)  
By replacing in [3’] variables L′ , σ′  and N′  by SLˆ′ , Sσ′ˆ  and SNˆ ′ , respectively, we obtain a 
single equation S  in only: 
 A
42
c
4
c
c
4
c
c
4
c A
N
2
W
2
N2
W
2
N
L
2
W
2
N χ
µ
=





ψ
ξ
+
ψ
β
ξ
+ψ
β
ξ
ψ
β
ξ
σ
E
S
v
EE
v
E
v
S
S
SS
S
S
S .  (9.8) 
Notice that the Right Hand Side does not depend on S , while the Left Hand Side does not 
involve µ . We shall deal with (9.8) by considering the LHS as a function of S , more 
precisely a product function that multiplies SLˆ′  by SSSS NL ˆcˆcˆcCO NL ′+σ′+′≡′ σ .  
Lemma. Functions SNˆ ′ , SLˆ′  and SCO ′  are increasing with 0SS ≥ . 
Proof. Function 20
2 SSS −a  is non-negative on [ )∞,0S , thus so does Sψ  hence SNˆ ′ , too. As 
for )/(1
V
1
SS
v ω+= , it is positive and has derivative 22 / Svv SS ω=′  which also is positive. Thus 
function SvS a  is both positive and strictly increasing with S  on [ )∞,0S . Coming back to 
Sψ ,  
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So Sψ  is increasing as well as non-negative on [ )∞,0S . The same applies to 2SS ψa . Then, 
from its definition the function 2
4
c
W
2
Nˆ
SSES
vLS ψ≡′
β
ξ
a  is the product of two non-negative and 
increasing functions on [ )∞,0S , which makes it non-negative and increasing on that domain. 
Concerning SCO ′ , 
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As we already know that both Sψ  and SSv2ψ  are increasing with respect to S  on [ )∞,0S , we 
only have to check that SvS SS /
2ψa  is increasing on that domain, in order to demonstrate 
that so is SCO ′  (postulating non-negative unit costs). By derivation, 
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which is indeed non-negative, implying that SvS SS /
2ψa  is increasing as well as non-
negative. 
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Proposition 1: Existence and uniqueness of a system optimum state under fixed demand. 
[i] Function aS SLˆ′ . SCO ′  is increasing with S  on [ )∞,0S  and varies from 0 to ∞+ .  
[ii] Therefore equation [3’] in S  admits a solution, which is unique. 
Proof. On domain ] [∞,0S  both functions SLˆ′  and SCO ′  are positive and strictly increasing 
since their derivatives are strictly positive there (postulating positive unit costs). Therefore 
their product is positive and strictly increasing, too. From its definition, Sψ  = 0 at 0S  and 
tends to infinity as S  increases indefinitely. Thus so do SNˆ ′  and SLˆ′  since 0V >→Sv  when 
+∞→S . This applies in turn to SCO ′  and SLˆ′ . SCO ′ , which establishes [i]. 
[ii] From the previous point, each value [ )∞∈ ,0y  is the image of one and one only 
[ )∞∈ ,0SS y . This applies notably to µχ= A/A41 Ey . Thus Equation [3’] admits one and one 
only solution in S . This solution induces SLˆ′ , Sσ′ˆ  and SNˆ ′  that solve the reduced problem of 
system optimization, meaning that there exists an optimal system state, which is unique. 
Proposition 2: Sensitivity analysis of optimum system state (under fixed demand).  
[i] The reduced system optimum solution ( SLˆ′ , SNˆ ′ , S ) decreases with µ  and so does the 
reduced operator cost, SCO ′ . 
[ii] With respect to region area A, the system optimum solution ( SLˆ′ , SNˆ ′ , S ) increases and 
so does the reduced operator cost, SCO ′ . 
Proof. [i] As SLˆ′  and SNˆ ′  increase with S , the chain functions )(ˆ ySL′  and )(ˆ ySN ′  increase with 
y . As µ  increases, µχ= A/A
4
1 Ey  decreases and so does yS  that solves the associated 
equation. By chaining, both functions )(
ˆ
µ′ ySL o  and )(ˆ µ′ ySN o  decrease with µ . The same 
reasoning applies to function SCO ′ . 
[ii] With respect to A, y  increases so the same line of argumentation applies to the optimal 
solution, yet in the opposite direction of variation. 
Then, in the fixed demand case, the wider the area to serve, the more infrastructure length and 
service vehicles are required for optimal service provision, yet also with increased station 
spacing and with larger operator costs.  
We may tentatively apply the same line of reasoning to the shape parameter, χ : larger values 
(e.g. 2 for grid networks) would yield larger solution triplets and operator costs than smaller 
ones (e.g. 1 for directional parallel lines). But this may well exceed the outreach of the model. 
9.2 Master program to determine dual parameter and demand flows 
In addition to the fixed demand problem, the variable demand problem involves the 
determination of the dual parameter µ  that acts as a scaling parameter, together with that of 
the demand flows: both are taken as exogenous factors in the fixed demand problem. 
So, in the master program dealing with system optimization under variable demand, let us 
specify the endogenous vector as follows: [ ]I)(, ∈µ iiQ . From it stem all of the other variables 
in the original system optimization problem, through the following algorithm: 
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“Derivation chain”: 
(i) By network component r : 
(a) Derive Effect factors XrE  by status X in {A/E, R, W} from current demand flows. 
(b) Solve the “fixed demand” problem to yield rS , rL  and rN . 
(c) Derive the related variables rσ , rv , rϕ  and Ard . 
(ii) By demand segment i : 
(a) Derive the user times by stage X in {A/E, R, W} from the related supply variables, 
∑ ∈= R XXX r rrii txt . 
(b) Derive the individual time costs, WWRREEAA: iiiiiiiii tttt γ+γ+γ+γ=θ .  
(c) Derive the optimal tariffs, iii QQ
&/:
1
µ
−µ−=τ  by solving the optimality condition 
about iτ  as a fixed point problem, )(D/)(D:
1
iiiiiii θ+τθ+τ−=τ µ
−µ & .  
(d) Let iiig θ+τ=: . 
Thus we can avail ourselves of “Derivation chain” as a subprogram. It exerts obvious 
feedback on the current state vector, since its )(kig  outcomes as of iteration k  enable us to 
infer “new” demand flows through the demand functions: )(D:ˆ )()( kii
k
i gQ = . 
Yet it is more robust to update the demand flows in a progressive way, by a rule of convex 
combinations: 
 )()()1( )1()(D: kik
k
iik
k
i QuguQ −+=
+ , (9.9) 
Wherein 0)( ≥kku  is a sequence of non-negative numbers that decrease to zero. 
A convergence criterion as follows: 
 [ ]∑
∈
−=
I
2)()()( )(D:CC
i
k
i
k
ii
k Qg , (9.10) 
 is useful to check the convergence of the computational scheme with respect to the demand 
flows. 
Assuming that this convergence has been achieved satisfactorily, the last issue to address 
consists in making the dual parameter µ  satisfy its own condition of optimality. 
As a higher µ  puts more emphasis on the amount of commercial revenues in the Lagrangian 
function, the solution optimized with respect to all of the other variables, taken as a function 
of µ  only, will yield larger commercial revenues as µ  increases: denoting 
∑∈
µµτ≡µ I
)()()( i ii QτQ , function )(µµ τQa  is an increasing one.  
If SR)1( ≥τQ  then the optimality condition is satisfied, so 1=µ  together with the derived 
outcomes provides an optimal system state. 
In most cases, however, we can expect that SR)1( <τQ , so that value 1 for µ  is only a lower 
bound and we have to look for a higher value in order to satisfy the budget constraint. To do 
that, we put forward a dichotomy strategy, by progressively halving an interval [ ]UL ,µµ  
between a lower bound Lµ  and an upper bound Uµ , of which either one is updated in each 
iteration of the dichotomy algorithm that follows. 
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Dichotomy scheme: 
(i) Set initial interval bounds [ ])1(U)1(L ,µµ  and iteration counter 1:=k . 
(ii) Let )(:ˆ )(U
)(
L2
1 kk µ+µ=µ  and derive the optimal system state conditionally to µˆ . 
(iii) If SR)ˆ( −µτQ  is smaller than a given preset tolerance then Terminate, else continue. 
(iv) If SR)ˆ( <µτQ  then { )(U
)1(
U
)1(
L :andˆ:
kkk µ=µµ=µ ++ } else { µ=µµ=µ ++ ˆ:and: )1(U
)(
L
)1(
L
kkk }. 
(v) Update 1: += kk  and go to Step (ii). 
 
Assuming “reasonable” demand functions with elasticity that is bounded and greater than -1, 
a natural candidate as initial upper bound is (Cf. eqn. (6.14)): 
 
M
M
1
1
:
ε+
=µ   wherein { }I:min:M ∈ε=ε ii . (9.10) 
Effectively, if SR)( M >µτQ  then we can use it as the initial upper bound in the Dichotomy 
scheme. Otherwise, if SR)( M <µτQ  then we can use Mµ  to update Lµ  and test M2µ  as 
candidate upper bound, and repeat that until the inequality constraint is satisfied. 
For the scheme to succeed, it requires that the target revenue SR can be achieved. Taking this 
condition as granted, then the dichotomy scheme will yield a value of µ  that meets the 
constraint, and this value will be the unique solution since function τQ  increases with µ . In 
other words: 
Proposition 3: Existence and uniqueness of a system optimum state under Variable 
demand. Assuming that the target revenue SR is feasible, there exists a state of System 
Optimum for the transit system under variable demand. This state is unique. 
 
